Explain how parliamentary sovereignty in India is curtailed by judicial review and constitutional amendments, clarifying with facts and reasoning.

Parliamentary sovereignty in India is not absolute. It is significantly limited by judicial review and the process of constitutional amendment. Key aspects to highlight are the supremacy of the Constitution, the role of the judiciary in interpreting and upholding the Constitution, and the limitations placed on Parliament’s amending powers by fundamental rights.

Parliamentary Sovereignty, Judicial Review, Constitutional Amendments, Basic Structure Doctrine, Fundamental Rights, Supremacy of the Constitution.

While India adopts a parliamentary form of government where the executive is responsible to the legislature, the concept of parliamentary sovereignty, as understood in the United Kingdom, is not rigidly applied. In India, the Constitution is supreme, and the powers of Parliament, the executive, and the judiciary are derived from and circumscribed by it. This section will explore how judicial review and constitutional amendments curtail the theoretical absolute sovereignty of the Indian Parliament, supported by relevant facts and reasoning.

Parliamentary sovereignty in India is significantly curtailed by two primary mechanisms: judicial review and the amendment process itself, particularly as interpreted by the judiciary.

Firstly, Judicial Review acts as a potent check on parliamentary power. The Supreme Court of India, under Articles 13, 32, and 226 of the Constitution, has the power to examine the constitutionality of any law passed by Parliament. If a law is found to contravene any provision of the Constitution, especially the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Part III, the judiciary can declare it null and void. A landmark case illustrating this is Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978), where the Supreme Court broadened the scope of Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) and held that any law infringing upon it must be fair, just, and reasonable. This established that Parliament cannot enact laws that arbitrarily deprive citizens of their fundamental freedoms, even if passed by a majority. The judiciary’s role here is not to question the wisdom of the legislature but to ensure adherence to the constitutional framework, thereby limiting Parliament’s unfettered law-making power.

Secondly, the power to amend the Constitution, though vested in Parliament under Article 368, is also not absolute and has been curtailed through judicial interpretation. While Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights, the Supreme Court, in the historic case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), propounded the ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’. This doctrine stipulates that while Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution, it cannot alter or destroy its essential features or basic structure. The Court identified features like the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of government, the federal character of the Constitution, the separation of powers, the sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic character of the Republic, the judicial review, and the rule of law as integral to the basic structure. Any amendment that violates this basic structure would be unconstitutional and liable to be struck down by the judiciary. This ruling effectively placed a constitutional restraint on Parliament’s amending power, ensuring that fundamental principles of the Constitution remain inviolable, thus curtailing absolute parliamentary sovereignty.

Furthermore, the interplay between Fundamental Rights and the amendment process has also shaped the extent of parliamentary power. Initially, in the Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (1951) and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965) cases, the Supreme Court held that Article 368 powers were wide enough to amend Fundamental Rights. However, the Full Bench in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967) ruled that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights. This was later overruled by the Kesavananda Bharati judgment, which upheld Parliament’s power to amend Fundamental Rights but within the confines of the Basic Structure Doctrine. The subsequent 42nd Amendment Act of 1976 attempted to immunize certain laws from judicial review and elevate Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights, but parts of it were struck down by the Supreme Court in the Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980) case, reinforcing the primacy of the basic structure and judicial review.

In conclusion, while the Indian Parliament operates within a parliamentary system, its sovereignty is considerably curtailed by the judiciary’s power of judicial review and the constitutional amendment process, particularly as interpreted by the Basic Structure Doctrine. The Constitution remains the supreme law, and Parliament’s actions are subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure they conform to the constitutional framework and its fundamental principles. This dual mechanism ensures a balance of power, preventing any single organ of the state, including Parliament, from becoming overwhelmingly sovereign and ensuring the preservation of India’s democratic and constitutional ethos.