To what extent, despite evolving judicial interpretation, does the constitutional framework fundamentally prioritise individual Fundamental Rights, significantly undermining the state’s pursuit of Directive Principles for collective welfare?

Fundamental Rights are justiciable, enforceable in courts, while Directive Principles of State Policy are not directly enforceable but are fundamental to governance. The initial judicial stance often prioritised Fundamental Rights. Significant judicial developments, particularly Kesavananda Bharati and Minerva Mills, shifted the approach towards harmonious construction and balancing the two parts of the Constitution. The tension between individual rights and collective welfare persists, but judicial interpretation seeks to reconcile rather than allow one to completely undermine the other. The basic structure doctrine plays a crucial role in this balance. The extent of ‘undermining’ is mitigated by the judiciary’s evolving interpretative framework which views FRs and DPSPs as complementary rather than contradictory.

Fundamental Rights (Part III of the Constitution): Entitlements guaranteed to individuals, enforceable against the state. Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV of the Constitution): Guidelines or goals for the state to achieve for collective welfare and social justice, not directly enforceable by courts. Judicial Interpretation: The process by which courts, especially the Supreme Court, interpret the meaning and application of constitutional provisions. Justiciability: The ability to be brought before a court of law for enforcement. Basic Structure Doctrine: A judicial principle that certain core features of the Constitution are unamendable. Harmonious Construction: A principle of interpretation that seeks to resolve conflicts between different provisions by finding a way for them to operate together.

The Indian Constitution embodies a unique framework balancing individual liberty and state responsibility for collective welfare. Part III enshrines Fundamental Rights, guaranteeing essential freedoms and protections enforceable against the state. Part IV outlines Directive Principles of State Policy, setting forth goals for the state to promote social and economic justice. An inherent tension exists between the enforceable individual rights and the aspirational collective welfare goals. This answer examines the extent to which, despite a dynamic history of judicial interpretation, the constitutional framework fundamentally prioritises Fundamental Rights, potentially undermining the state’s pursuit of Directive Principles for collective welfare. It will argue that while initial and inherent characteristics lean towards FRs’ priority due to justiciability, the evolving judicial approach has largely moved towards reconciliation and balancing, limiting the extent of fundamental undermining.

Constitutionally, Fundamental Rights are presented as justiciable and paramount over ordinary law (Article 13), while Directive Principles are non-justiciable (Article 37), albeit fundamental to the country’s governance. This structural difference initially led to a judicial understanding where FRs held a superior position. Early cases like Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh, while dealing with amendment power, reinforced the idea of Parliament’s ability to amend even FRs, implying a legislative potential to prioritise DPSP implementation if deemed necessary, yet the inherent justiciability of FRs remained a check. The Golak Nath case marked a significant shift, declaring FRs transcendental and immutable, beyond Parliament’s amending power. This ruling strongly prioritised FRs, making them virtually immune to legislative action aimed at implementing DPSPs if it involved abridging FRs. This period arguably represented the peak of FRs potentially undermining DPSP implementation by restricting state action. However, the landmark Kesavananda Bharati case redefined the relationship. While upholding Parliament’s amending power, it introduced the Basic Structure Doctrine, asserting that core features of the Constitution, including some Fundamental Rights and arguably the balance between FRs and DPSPs, cannot be destroyed. This judgment, while not explicitly stating FRs are superior, recognised the significance of both parts and laid the groundwork for a more balanced approach. The 42nd Amendment Act attempted to give primacy to certain DPSPs (Article 39(b) and (c)) over FRs under Articles 14, 19, and 31 (then existing). However, the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills struck down this extended primacy, reaffirming that the harmony and balance between FRs and DPSPs is itself a part of the basic structure. The Court famously described FRs and DPSPs as the two wheels of the chariot, equally important and meant to run together. This marked a decisive turn towards judicial reconciliation. Subsequent judicial interpretation has adopted a harmonious construction approach. Courts now often interpret FRs in light of DPSPs, using the Directive Principles to understand the scope and ambit of Fundamental Rights. For instance, the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 has been expanded through judicial interpretation to include various socio-economic rights like the right to education, health, livelihood, and a clean environment, drawing inspiration directly from corresponding DPSPs (Articles 39(a), 41, 47, 48A). This approach doesn’t undermine DPSPs but rather elevates their principles by integrating them into the enforceable framework of FRs. Furthermore, courts have used DPSPs as aids in upholding the constitutionality of laws that potentially restrict FRs, provided such laws are reasonable and designed to achieve DPSP goals in a just and fair manner. Public Interest Litigation has also facilitated the enforcement of DPSP-related concerns through the expansive interpretation of FRs. Thus, while the constitutional design gives FRs inherent priority through justiciability and judicial review provides a mechanism to enforce this, the evolving judicial interpretation has significantly tempered the potential for FRs to fundamentally undermine DPSPs. Instead, the judiciary strives for a synthesis, viewing them as complementary instruments for achieving social revolution and national goals. Direct conflicts still arise, and in such instances, the court performs a balancing act, but the principle guiding this act is increasingly one of harmony rather than absolute hierarchical supremacy of FRs.

In conclusion, the constitutional framework initially presents Fundamental Rights with a clear priority due to their justiciability compared to the non-justiciable Directive Principles. This structural difference and early judicial interpretations did create situations where FRs could restrict the state’s ability to implement DPSPs. However, the trajectory of judicial interpretation, particularly from Kesavananda Bharati onwards, demonstrates a significant shift towards harmonising Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. The judiciary no longer views them as strictly antagonistic or hierarchical but as complementary aspects of the same constitutional vision aiming for social justice and individual dignity. While FRs continue to serve as essential checks on state power, preventing arbitrary action in the name of collective welfare, the courts actively seek to reconcile potential conflicts by interpreting FRs in light of DPSPs and upholding the balance between individual liberty and state’s socio-economic obligations as part of the basic structure. Therefore, despite the initial framework and the inherent priority of justiciability, evolving judicial interpretation has largely prevented Fundamental Rights from fundamentally or absolutely undermining the state’s legitimate pursuit of Directive Principles for collective welfare, instead fostering an environment of dynamic balance and mutual relevance.